





Introduction to the Tata Group

One of the world's fastest-growing and most reputable corporations











Tata Group

- Founded in 1868
- Operations in more than 100 countries and 695,000 employees
- Total revenues of more than \$100 billion (68% from outside India)
- Ranked world's 11th most reputable and 17th most innovative company
- Promoter company Tata Sons 66% owned by philanthropic trusts
- £100 million invested in community projects every year

Introduction to the Tata Steel Group

One of the world's most geographically-diversified steel producers



Tata Steel Group

- 11th largest global steel producer
- Annual crude steel capacity of more than 27.5 million tonnes
- Around 74,000 employees
- Manufacturing operations in 26 countries across five continents
- Present in both mature and developing markets
- Revenue in 2017 \$18.1 billion (€15.5 billion)
- Fortune 500 company

History of Process Safety events

World Industry



Piper Alpha (167†) 1988



Texas City (15†) 2005



Macondo Well (11†) 2010



Steel **Industry**



Ternium Steel 2013 (11†)



CSN, Brazil 2006



China steel ladle 2007 (32†)



Tata Steel



Jamshedpur GH (1†) 2013



Port Talbot Torpedo 2019



Port Talbot ladle drop 2013



Coke Gas heating alley



Tata Steel local



BF bleeder valve IJmuiden

Pickling line fire

TATA steel in the news

April 2019



Steel plant explosion: Two burned at Tata in Port Talbot



Link to news website

March 2019

BUSINESS

EXPLOSION AT TATA STEEL FACTORY INJURES WORKERS

By Zack Newmark on March 20, 2019 - 16:10

Explosion at TATA Steel

Four people were injured when an explosion took place at a Tata Steel facility. All four of the victims are employees who were transported to area hospitals, the company said. Their injuries were not specified, but were not believed to be life threatening, a Tata Steel spokesperson told several news outlets.


One resident told that they heard a loud dull boom, and could feel the ground rumbling below his home.

The situation was reportedly under control by noon, and no toxic emissions were released.



General information

The explosion happened in Scrubber B. The purpose of the scrubbers is to remove ammonia from a gas stream containing light HC's. This is done by countercurrent washing the gas with acid water.



Incident timeline

Scrubber was out of service and positive isolated.

Contractor work was performed on column internals.

Flammable gas entered space between inlet gas valve and blind through passing gas inlet valve over a period of > 1 week.

Column internal work was completed. Contractor closed scrubber manholes.

Blinds of connecting small fluid supply lines were removed.


Gas entered the scrubber through acid water supply line from other scrubber.

6 Lunch break


Contractor starts removing blind in gas inlet line with pneumatic wrench.

Ignition of explosive atmosphere between inlet gas valve and blind (A).

Explosion inside scrubber column.



Incident Causes



gas.

Inadequate DESIGN: Ball valve of acid water supply inlet (K3901) not sufficiently tight. Pipework not designed to prevent backflow of gas.

pipework connects

both NH3-scrubbers.

Ignition of coke gas in fitting piece.

Sparks from bolt on flange ignited coke oven gas in fitting piece.

> Explosion of NH3scrubber K3901.

Explosion in gas inlet fitting piece propogated to K3901 (ignition source).


Four contractors injured.


Potentially fatal incident (consequence 4 on **TATA Steel risk** grid).

Asset loss & financial damage.


Severe financial consequences consequence 3 on TATA Steel risk grid).







General key learnings



General key learnings

Do we understand what can go wrong?

Do we know what barriers we have to ensure that it doesn't go wrong?

Do we know that our barriers are effective and working properly?

1. Plant

- Plant design hold invisible risks: Why did they do it? What more did we miss?
- Valves can pass.

2. Process

- o Do you have an unambiguous and structured MOC and PtW process?
- PHA process is not applied thoroughly enough to identify all hazards and scenarios.

3. People

- Normalisation
- Discipline
- Communication:
 - Contractor didn't feel comfortable
 - Visible supervision missing





